Need for Permanent storage

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a series of fires at the Rocky Flats facility in Colorado. These fires caused the airborne release of plutonium over parts of Denver. This lead the Department of Energy (DOE) to stop storing plutonium wastes at the Rocky Flats facility. The Idaho National Engineering Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) agreed to store Transuranic Waste (TRU), but only for a period of ten years.

The DOE began searching for a permanent storage site keeping in mind a report that the national Academy of Scientists had made in 1957 about storage of radioactive waste. They had recommended deep-geological disposal of transurnaic waste in stable formations, such as bedded salt, as the best place for long term storage. Beginning in 1970, the DOE began storing all of its Transuranic Waste in areas where it could easily be removed and transferred, under the assumption that a permanent disposal facility would open eventually.

Choosing a site

At first, the DOE considered an abandoned salt mine near Lyon, Kansas. This was met with strong opposition from Kansas state officials. This opposition, combined with the large number of poorly plugged boreholes at the site removed the proposed Lyon site from the list of potential storage facilities.

There were several sites in New Mexico that were under consideration. Although a poll among residents of southern New Mexico showed opposition to the plant at a rate of 3 to 1, there was considerable encouragement from local businessmen and politicians. Carlsbad was chosen as the site for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Locals felt their concerns had simply been ignored, while local and state politicians had used the depressed economic conditions in that part of state to push the project forward.

Twenty Years of Legal Back and Forth

By the late 1970s, there was concern about the DOE's plan to store high-level waste at the Wast Isolation Plant being built in New Mexico. Original plans were for a 2 level storage facility. The lower level would be designated for hotter wastes and 1,000 commercial spent fuel rods. In 1978, the Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, tried to reassure the people of New Mexico by promising that the state would have veto power of WIPP and the facility would be subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing. In reality, WIPP was classified as a military project. This meant it was under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees in Congress. These committees did not want the interference of an outside agency in what they felt was a matter of National Security, and wouldn't allow NRC licensing and state veto power.

The DOE authorization bill of 1979 was amended, thus authorizing WIPP. High Level Waste such as fuel rods and waste from reprocessing was excluded for permanent storage, but was allowed for what was referred to as "experiments." NRC licensing was specifically forbidden as was state veto power, although the state could have "consultation and cooperation" power with the committee.

The WIPP project was opposed by the Carter administration and was stalled throughout 1980. At the end of that year, the DOE released its Final Environmental Impact Statement on WIPP. It called for WIPP to be compared with other High Level Waste disposal sites and recommended that the project be delayed to allow for more time to review construction plans and outside consultation. However, once the Reagan administration was in power, it was announced that the project was back on and that underground mining and construction would begin.

The State of New Mexico sued to stop WIPP from being constructed as planned. The matter was settled out of court with an agreement between New Mexico and the DOE. The State of New Mexico would allow the permanent construction and underground excavation, but the DOE had to agree to allow for independent state monitoring and testing. As part of the agreement all Transuranic Waste brought in would be stored in a retrievable way for a short period before the repository was closed.

When tests were conducted, it was discovered that the site chosen for the repository had deposits of brine, water that is highly saturated with salt. The location of the facility had to be moved. Ironically, the new site was on top of more brine, but the location was not moved again. When construction began at the site several hundred people demonstrated against the WIPP. Police arrested twenty protesters.

In 1982, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) was passed by Congress. The act mandated that all high level waster repositories would be licensed by the NRC and gave veto power to states, although Congress retained the right to override the state veto. This had little effect on WIPP, since it was still classified as a military project and not covered by the ACT.

In 1984 the agreement between New Mexico and the DOE was modified. The DOE agreed to conduct more geological studies and be in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws, including Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards regarding permanent storage of radioactive waste. The WIPP facility would still accept some high-level waste to be used in experiments, but the amount of Transuranic Waste that would be stored on site was limited.

In 1987, a federal court ruled that current EPA standards were too weak and ordered them to research and rewrite new standards. At this time WIPP was known to have several problems and it was believed that the site would not have met even the old standards. At this time the DOE announced that WIPP would be opened for what it was calling a Test Phase in which 15% of the wastes would be stored there for tests. Since these wastes were not being put there for permanent storage, but rather part of tests, they would not be regulated under the stricter EPA standards for permanent waste. Only if, after 15% was in position, the DOE decided it would dispose of the waste would it have to be in compliance with disposal standards. This announcement triggered New Mexicans to protest outside of the offices of the state's senators.

During 1987, the DOE applied for the permission to use the TRUPACT-I shipping container. The Department of Transportation denied the request due to poor design. After this the DOE and the State of New Mexico modified their agreement again. The DOE agreed to get NRC certification for future shipping containers. They would also agree to comply with EPA, DOT, and NRC regulations relating to WIPP. They also promised to get $190 million to improve roads and bypasses that were on the route to WIPP. The agreement also included stipulations against mining and drilling into the WIPP site and that both natural and engineered mechanisms would be used to confine the waste. The governor of New Mexico, Carruthers, announced that with these new amendments to the agreement with the DOE, the state had resolved their concerns.

The DOE announced that WIPP would be ready to start receiving waste in 1988. To prepare for the grand opening, the DOE began to withdraw the land surrounding the WIPP site from general use and put it under the strict control of the DOE. The process of bringing the Land Withdrawal Act before Congress meant that WIPP would come under the jurisdiction of committees other than the Armed Services Committees. When hearings with these committees were held, numerous problems with the area and facility were revealed. It would eventually take five years for the Act to be passed.

By 1988, the Governor of Idaho had refused to accept any more waste into the state. Although a few more shipments were allowed, by 1989 the DOE was trying to find interim storage for the its waste until WIPP could start to accept waste.

Since so much had changed since the original EIS and since several environmental groups and the state of Texas had threatened to sue, the DOE decided to supplement the 1980 EIS and hold hearings. They also announced that the Test Phase plan would only bring in 3% to 8% of waste to WIPP. During the hearings, most of the 800 people that testified criticized the facility and the Test Phase.

In 1990 the Final SEIS was issued. The DOE stated that it was going to be in full compliance with RCRA requirements. This included the regulation of the hazardous material in the mixed waste. While the DOE publicly pledged that it would be in full compliance, it also applied and received a variance allowing it to not have to meet the requirements for the Test Phase. In the same year the NRC denied approval of 24 defective TRUPACT-II shipping containers. It was also during 1990 that the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board (EIB) held route designation hearings.

By the next year the state of New Mexico had designated the routes that would lead to WIPP, which were on Highway 285 for much of the time. During 1991, the DOE and the Department of the Interior (DOI) ran into trouble withdrawing the land for WIPP. Since the Land Withdrawal Act had still not passed at this time, the two departments made several attempts to withdraw the land administratively. These were blocked by Representative Bill Richardson, and a lawsuit filed by the Attorney General and several environmental groups. This resulted in a preliminary injunction against the opening of WIPP.

When the Land Withdrawal Act did finally pass in 1992 there were several provisions. They included

• Permission to allow for the Test Phase.
• WIPP must comply with EPA regulations for permanent disposal under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRC).
• The WIPP site had to be in compliance with the Solid Waste Disposal Act which pertained to regulating hazardous components of the mixed waste.
• The DOE was required to help New Mexico get money for highway upgrades and for training and emergency equipment.
• Creation of plans for how to retrieve TRU waste and for decommissioning of the WIPP.
• Any High Level Waste, even if it was just for experiments, was prohibited.
• WIPP needed EPA certification. The DOE would no longer be able to certify the facility itself. It would be up to the EPA to decide if WIPP could safely contain the waste.

The following year the DOE admitted that experiments with WIPP waste in the repository was not scientifically justified. The alcove rooms excavated in salt could not be sealed and would not be able to be used for gas generation experiments underground. All tests could be done better if conducted in the controlled environment of a laboratory. In 1993 the Test Phase was canceled. With that the DOE began concentrating its efforts to open the WIPP as a permanent disposal facility. In 1994 and 1995 tests were conducted to understand the hydrology and the geology of the area. The tests were crucial to show compliance with permanent disposal standards. Since the DOE started these tests so late, they would be on going even after the repository was scheduled to open. Even though tests were in progress to determine if the site could actually contain the waste being put there for 10,000 years, they would not be completed until after the DOE has started storing waste underground.

In 1995, the EPA held hearings for revising the compliance criteria for permanent disposal and came out with a draft version in the later part of the year. The EPA then entered into discussions with the DOE, Westinghouse (the contractor in charge of WIPP) and the Office of Management and Budget. After these discussions, the EPA presented a watered down version of the criteria in the beginning of 1996. The DOE, which previously were given no credit, would now be given credit for passive institutional control like markers and records being effective for 700 years. Realistic mining scenarios were not fully considered. The effects of potash mining were limited to its effect on water movement. The potential use of radioactive potash in agriculture was not considered. The method of estimating the number of boreholes in and around the site was changed. DOE was allowed to eliminate some areas with high numbers of boreholes and include a time period before there was drilling activity near the WIPP site. This resulted in lowering the estimated number of holes (and thus the estimated probability of drilling into the site) by more than 50%. The requirement that the site not be in an area of major natural resources was gutted.

A Defense Authorization Bill was passed in 1996 and carried with it an amendment that changed the Land Withdrawal Act.

• All references to the Test Phase had been removed.
• WIPP was not required to have to comply with the Solid Waste Disposal Act regulations on mixed waste.
• The WIPP facility was exempt from having to treat its waste to meet RCRA land disposal restrictions.
• All reference to retrievability were deleted from the Land Withdrawal Acts as well as necessitating their being plans for decommissioning the facility, for disposing of all the TRU-waste and for surveying the TRU-waste all DOE facilities.

The original Land Withdrawal Act had a 6 month waiting period for Congress and the public to review the situation if WIPP did show compliance with EPA disposal criteria. This period was shortened to 30 days and DOE was encouraged by the amendment to make every effort to open the facility by November 1997.

The DOE was not able to open the facility by 1997. It had submitted its Compliance Criteria Application to EPA in 1996 and hearings were held on whether WIPP could be shown to meet the criteria necessary to prove the facility could contain Transuranic Waste for 10,000 years. There were problems with the DOE's application and EPA's review of that application. The most serious problem was the EPA's almost total reliance on DOE for technical and scientific answers. Instead of using their own mathematical models and do their own calculations to see if the DOE figures were correct, the EPA simply used the DOE's models and used DOE's data. The EPA did this even when the DOE's models were unique to WIPP and not generally used elsewhere.

The EPA certified in May of 1998 that WIPP complied with EPA standards for long term isolation of Transuranic Waste. However, the facility still couldn't open because of lawsuits by environmental groups claiming that it had to be permitted for operation as a hazardous waste disposal facility under RCRA. DOE claimed that it fell under "interim" RCRA standards for fixed waste which didn't require that the facility be permitted and that purely radioactive waste could be brought to WIPP because that waste was not regulated under RCRA. DOE continued to state, however, that they would not ship anything to WIPP before they received their RCRA permit.

There were hearings on this operating permit for 5 weeks in February of 1999. On March 26, 1999 on the last day of the permit hearings and before the permit was issued, waste from Los Alamos National Laboratory was shipped to WIPP. The waste was from an artificially created waste stream and was purely radioactive waste.

The NMED issued a final permit for WIPP later in that year. In the permit certain chemicals, free liquids, all remotely handled waste and various other items were prohibited from being disposed at WIPP. The characterization was to be performed at generator sites. This process was to be audited by the DOE and overseen by the NMED. This audit process would take the place of fingerprinting at WIPP. Fingerprinting is done by sampling and analyzing a portion of the waste received by the disposal facility to make sure characterization was done properly by the generating facility. Fingerprinting is usually done at other hazardous waste dumps but not required at WIPP. The permit also required there to be financial assurances that there would be enough money to properly close the site after its 35 year operational period was over.

Once the operating permit was issued and waste was being sent to WIPP, there were various lawsuits brought by both the DOE and environmental groups against NMED. Lawsuits were also brought against the DOE regarding the safety of their transportation, irregularities in the NEPA process, and raising environmental justice issues. The DOE argued that they should not have to provide financial assurance for WIPP because the federal government could be counted on to have enough money to close WIPP properly at the end of its operational life. The DOE then withheld millions of dollars promised for road improvement money for the WIPP route in New Mexico because they claimed they couldn't afford both the road improvements and financial assurance. Later that year, Senator Domenici changed one of the budget bills to exempt WIPP from having to provide financial assurance. Afterwards the DOE released the money for the roads.

Open and receiving waste from Hanford

On March 26, 1999, WIPP officially opened. It is located 26 miles outside of Carlsbad, New Mexico. The facilities include disposal rooms excavated in an ancient, stable salt formation 2,150 feet (almost one half mile) underground. During its expected 35 year operating life, the DOE hopes to transport approximately 37,000 loads of Transuranic Waste from 23 locations.

When WIPP opened workers at Hanford began to retrieve, package and ship the Transuranic Waste that it had stored on site. Hanford made its first shipment of Transuranic Waste to WIPP on July 4, 2000. The trip is about 1,800 miles long and takes around 46 hours. The driver is required to stop every 100 miles to perform an inspection on the container. As of July 2010, Hanford made 481 shipments of Transuranic Waste to WIPP. By the year 2032, the DOE estimates that there will be 2,500 shipments of TRU waste from Hanford to WIPP.

Markers and Warnings

Since wastes stored at WIPP will remain dangerous until 12006, scientists want to mark the area in a way that will still be understandable to humans for the next 500 generations. When the DOE started planning WIPP, it organized a team of linguistics, scientists, and artists to help create markers that would both last thousands of years and be intelligible. The group immediately ruled out any digital or paper records. Everything would have to be cast in stone. The trefoil symbol for radioactive material would not be enough, since it has as much chance of being understood by future civilizations as English.

The first warning will be a 98-foot-wide, 33-foot-tall, 2-mile-long berm surrounding the site. There will be powerful magnets and radar reflectors buried inside the berm so that remote sensors will recognize the site as being purposefully designed. There will be 32 markers outside the berm and another 16 inside. These will be made of granite or concrete and will stand 25 feet high and weigh 105 tons. Each one will be engraved with warnings in English, Spanish, Russian, French, Chinese, Arabic, and Navajo, with blank space to add warnings in contemporary languages. There will also be pictures to denote buried hazards and human faces of horror and revulsion. These same symbols will be printed on metal, plastic and ceramic disks that will be buried just below the surface.

There will also be three information rooms with detailed drawings of WIPP's chambers and the physics of why it is hazardous on stone tablets. There will also be a world map that will show all other known repositories. A star chart will be included to calculate the year the site was sealed. One of these rooms will be located in the center of the site. There will be another buried inside the berm. The entrance to it will only be a 2 foot hole so as to prevent the theft of the tablets. The third room will be off site. Scientists expect it will take years to build and test the markers.

When WIPP is finally sealed in 2032, some of WIPP's officials want the site left unmarked out of concern that any warnings would draw only more attention. If it is a visible monument, they expect it would inevitably become a tourist attraction.

Part one of a radio story about WIPP from May 13, 2010

Part two of a radio story about WIPP from May 14, 2010

References

http://www.wipp.energy.gov/fctshts/Why_WIPP.pdf http://www.ci.richland.wa.us/Richland/Hanford/index.cfm?PageNum=14 http://www.wipp.energy.gov/pr/2000/Hanfordship.pdf http://www.cardnm.org/backfrm_a.html