History

Radiocarbon dating places the first occupants on Amchitka back 3,600 to 4,600 years ago. In 1913, President Taft signed an executive order creating the "Aleutian Island Reservation." It stretched over one thousand miles and covered nearly three million acres. The land was "set apart as a preserve and breeding ground for native birds, for the propagation of reindeer and furbearing animals, and for the encouragement and development of the fisheries." The Aleutians who lived there also became part of the public trust.

Control of the Amchitka was fought over during World War II. Although Japan decided ultimately not to use the Island because it was "too musy," the US force wanted to make sure there were no enemy inhabitants. Pilots were sent in to bomb all the abandoned structures left by evacuated Aleutians. One pilot expressed having reservations about bombing a church, but after a few passes, completed his mission. After the bombing mission, the army set up camp on the island, construction of which damaged some of the natural beauty of the area.

Project Windstorm

The Armed Force Special Weapons Project wanted to begin testing nuclear weapons on the surface and underground to evaluate this type of explosion from a military point of view. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted information about proposed test sites, but analysis was inconclusive. The scientists that the Army consulted advised not to perform tests in the continental US because of safety concerns, security, public relations, climate, geology, cost, and accessibility.

The locations considered were remote parts of Australia and Canada, as well as the Caribbean and Hawaiian Islands. The Alaskan interior was initially discarded because of inaccessibility, climate and, the large number of trappers and prospectors. However, President Truman approved both underground and surface testing in Alaska on Oct. 30, 1950.

Operation Windstorm was scheduled for detonation between September 15 and November 15 1951. The goal was not to test the functioning of an atomic bomb, but to determine the effects caused by underground explosion in terms of size of crater, earth shock, immediate radiation and persistence of radiological effects. This information would be used for "war planning."

Preparations for the test began in secret. Soon the planners considered whether or not to make public the need and nature of the Windstorm test. As more and more workers began arriving on Amchitka, secrecy of the project became more difficult. The area was going to have to be closed off to air and sea travel and the concern grew over how rumors would be leaked to the press or used in Soviet propaganda.

The Joint Chiefs of State (JCOS) prepared a press release about their operations on the island but made no mention of a bomb or underground testing. AEC officials and the Secretary of State worried how this would affect public relations if the information was leaked. The JCOS agreed and began revising the statement. Before it was released, the Anchorage Daily Times published a story on March 28, 1951 with the headline "U.S. May Hold Atom Bomb Tests on Aleutian Island."

The test was postponed and it was moved to Nevada. Regarding the test, AEC Commissioner Willard F. Libby said "People have got to learn to live with the facts of life, and part of the facts of life are fallout."

Project Long Shot

Project Long Shot was the first nuclear explosion held in Alaska. It was an eighty thousand ton blast detonated at the bottom of a 2,300 foot shaft on October 29, 1965. The size of the blast was considered acceptable since Amchitka was sufficiently removed from population centers. Alaska, being a seismically sensitive area, made it an even better test site. Scientist were interested in seeing if it was possible to differentiate between a man made explosion and an earthquake in the unstable environment. This would be helpful information for United States monitoring of Soviets tests. The test did not prove that the U.S. could tell the difference between man-made explosions and natural earthquakes.

(photo courtesy of NASA)

What damage Long Shot would do to the wildlife in the area was to be determined by a study of "bioenvironmental safety." The study was conducted by the University of Washington Biology Laboratory, Sandia Corp., and officials from the AEC Operational Safety Division. The group determined that fallout was a "remote possibility." Their highest concern was in regards to sea otters, sea lions, and other organism experiences adverse effects from underwater landslides caused by a bomb.

From the initial planning stages, the Department of Defense (DOD) wanted to conceal Long Shot in order to gauge how well other countries could detect an underground explosion of this size. Originally the AEC was not going to be informed, but it was discovered that this was legally impossible. Top Alaskan officials had been briefed beginning in 1964. There was "no serious objections" from the senators, representatives, or the governor. The director of the Wildife Refuge where the test was going to take place would not be informed.

On March 27, 1964, the largest earthquake ever recorded in North America happened in Alaska. This had little effect on the planning of the test except for Governor Egan of Alaska, who was concerned that Long Shot would have a "probable psychological effect on the populace." On February 3, 1965 an earthquake hit a part of the Aleutian Island known as the Rat Islands. The Department of Defense organized an inspection party to survey the area. Although it had been well shaken, there seemed to be no permanent damage. Caretakers from the Wildlife Reserve were asked to come on the inspection, but not informed why the DOD was interested in earthquake damage.

By March of 1965 rumors surrounding the test were abundant. The DOD & AEC decided it would be better to inform the public and attempt to win their support for the tests. Governor Egan told the people of Alaska that they should be proud to participate "in national security" by being "hosts, so to speak, for this test." He referred to the over 140 tests conducted in Nevada that had "proven that there is no danger from radioactivity being released in the test area." In fact, at that time, 56 of the Nevada tests had leaked radioactivity.

Damage from Long Shot

The official report on the damage caused by the test included cracks in uncompacted ground and roads as far as 7,400 feet south and 3,700 feet north of ground zero. Ponds were tilted and there was slumping of stream banks as far as 3,200 feet away. Rockfalls occurred on the Bering seacoast 10,000 feet northeast of ground zero. There were also several mud geysers within 2,4000 feet of ground zero.

The Long Shot test had also leaked radionuclides into the environment. Two post test expeditions discovered explosion-produced "anomalies." Drilling and sampling found four released radioisotopes: Tritium (H3) as tritiated water, tritiated methane (CH3 T), iodine (I 131) and krypton (Kr 85). The levels of these did not exceed AEC guidelines, but were substantially above what would be present in normal environments. The long term effects of this is unknown. It is also unknown if it is possible that this waste could migrate to the nearby Bering Sea and North Pacific Ocean

After the test, a scientist at New York's American Museum of Natural History wrote that it would be difficult to persuade young people of the need to conserve wildlife when their own government disregards such advice.

Shot Milrow

With the success of Long Shot, the AEC began planning another test for Alaska. Shot Milrow (originally code named Ganja until someone discovered that it was the Turkish word for marijuana) was the second scheduled test at Amchitka. The test was designed in part to test the extent to which Amchitka could withstand an explosive force in excess of one million tons of TNT.

Concern from the Scientific Community

While government scientists were adamant about the safety of the Milrow test, scientists outside of the government were publicly questioning theses claims. In November of 1968, a panel of experts was formed with Kenneth Pitzer, the current President of Stanford as well as a former AEC research official, and the chairman of President Johnson's Science Advisory Committee, serving as chair. Their conclusions called for the need of an independent look at the likelihood of the blast triggering an earthquake. There were also fears that the tests could cause underwater soil slides, tsunamis, and radioactive contamination of the Bering Sea and North Pacific.

None of the claims made by the panel had been disputed by the AEC, but they felt that they should not be given any prominence. Ultimately the Office of Science and Technology recommended that neither the Pitzer Panel reports nor the AEC reports should be released to the public. The Office warned that the reports of the panel could be used by the press to "build up an earthquake threat." The Office also felt that the conflicting reports "could produce a further confrontation between the scientific community and the Government." Pitzer protested such a one sided approach and invited members of his panel to publish their research in scientific journals.

Senate Opposition

The recommendations of the panel prompted newly elected Senator Gravel to begin building up opposition in Washington to the Milrow test. Gravel felt that the AEC should not be able to determine safety issues concerning its own nuclear testing and wanted an independent agency created. After serving in the Senate for only a few months, he introduced a bill calling for the creation of the "National Commission on Nuclear Safety." This brought national attention to the tests at Amchitka, drawing more supporters to his efforts.

In September 1969, Hawaiian congresswoman Patsy Mink, along with fifteen co-sponsors, introduced a resolution calling attention to the inherent threats of nuclear testing. The resolution requested the immediate suspension of Aleutian tests pending an evaluation of underground nuclear detonations. Encouraged by this support and the official complaints being made by Canada and Japan, Gravel and Hawaiian Senator Hiram Fong submitted a joint resolution asking for a full investigation on how nuclear testing affects U.S. foreign policy.

Public Opposition

William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, scheduled a televised hearing for September 29, 1969. This was done to drum up pubic pressure to try and persuade President Nixon to stop, or at least postpone, the test. Opponents of underground testing used the hearings as an opportunity to demonstrate support for their cause. Senator Daniel Inouye submitted a petition opposing nucelar bomb testing, signed by 325 Hawaiian school children. The president of the AFL-CIO filed a protest signed by 14,000 of his members and their families. In addition, the 80,000 member National Audubon Society voiced their opposition to the tests. Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson said the AEC was making "a mockery of the name wildlife refuge." He pointed out the irony in choosing a place where hunting is prohibited to test the "biggest firearm of all, nuclear bombs."

As the day for the test drew closer, citizens of the state increased their protest. One Alaskan wrote Senator Gravel, "If the tests are so safe, let them set them off under the Pentagon." Another Alaskan, who was concerned with the damage that earthquakes had done to the state, wrote to Congressman Howard Pollock, "Alaska is my home and I would prefer to have it solidly under me in one piece." The National Sportsman Council was worried about the effects of radiation on the fish population. Many Alaskans wanted a risk assessment from an independent source.

A group calling themselves Democrats for Issues and Action formed in opposition of the tests. At first they simply asked the governor to delay the test while an independent commission could conduct a study on the possible effects on the fault line and wildlife. Later they called for transferring the money that funded the Anti-Ballistic Missile program to "jobs, native land claims, clear air, clean water, rural electrification, medical facilities, and Alaska conservation." The group later reconstituted itself into the Save our State Committee (SOS) and elected Martin Farrell, Jr. as their chairman. The SOS Committiee's stated goal was to make sure all the safety issues were resolved before the test took place. The group organized several protests. They also took out full page ads in the Anchorage Daily News warning of a blast that would be "50 times the amount used to level Hiroshima in 1945."

The determination of the SOS Committiee, Farrell in particular, puzzled the AEC. The AEC was convinced "Farrell was working as a paid representative for a client and spoke as directed rather than from personal conviction." Farrell didn't trust the AEC or DOD and was worried that his activities were being monitored because he once caught an Air Force officer taking his picture. On the day of the Milrow test, Farrell went to the ballroom of Anchorage's Westward Hotel to attend the AEC sponsored countdown celebration. Although Farrell was sitting in the back, he was told by AEC personal that he had to leave. When Farrell ignored them, two men picked him and the chair he was sitting on up and took him outside the ballroom.

International response

The Canadian and Japanese governments indicated their displeasure with nuclear testing in Alaska by sending official protests prior to Milrow. Canada was so worried about fallout that it threatened to bill the US for any unwanted consequences. Hugh Curtis, mayor of Saanich, British Columbia said "I don't recall in my lifetime any incident which has put such stress on friendship which Canada's have held for America." The Japanese newspapers Asahi Shimbun and Yomuri Shimbun called Mirlow "highly deplorable" especially since the test was conducted in rich international fishing grounds. The official Soviet state paper, Izvestia, noted the risks of triggering earth quakes and tsumnais.

Damage from Milrow

On October 2, 1969, at 12:06 p.m. Bering Daylight Savings Time, Shot Milrow was detonated at the bottom of a shaft 3,992 feet below ground surface level. The AEC called the test a total success with no earthquakes, tsunamis, or other significant damage to the surrounding environmetn. Many felt the AEC was being purposely misleading.

Seismic readings indicated that Milrow had caused "hundreds of small, shallow-focus earthquakes" within a three mile radius of ground zero. Aftershocks continued for thirty-seven hours until the blast cavity collapsed. Although there was no major damage, the blast also caused displacement of a fault line running into an intertidal beach on the Pacific Coast at Duck Cove. The uplift on one side of the fault amounted to an estimated five inches. Rock between one hundred and five hundred feet of earth was pulverized. The ground heaved upwards fourteen feet at the detonation point and debris spread out more than three miles from ground zero.

There were rockfalls, turf slides, and destruction of sea stack outcroppings used by nesting birds. Approximately 2,800 cubic yards of rock and peat fell along coastal areas. Large blocks of inland tundra mantle were torn up and fell into "random orientations." When the chimney collapsed there were fractures in the tundra that left behind mounded rows of soil five feet high. The shock wave changed stream flow rates and caused the partial drainage of two lakes. The fissures at the bottom of these lakes were still clearly visible six years later.

The wildlife of the area also suffered. The coastal rock falls destroyed intertidal algae and invertebrates. A shift in the fault line at Duck Cove damaged algae colonies and caused erosion in ten acres. The erosion adversely affected invertebrate species dependent on this cover. Shock waves cast fish ashore from freshwater ponds three thousand feet from surface ground zero.

The blast, together with the preparation, reeked heavily on the ecological situation. There was pollution in nine miles of streams and fifty five acres of ponds. Mud slides caused damage to stream beds. There were "toxic releases" from drilling that nearly destroyed the Clevenger Creek drainage region. Pink salmon experience declines in population. Human waste caused an outbreak of blue-green algae in the streams. Garbage dumps became unnatural havens for bald eagles, gulls, and rats.

In March of 1970, the AEC supported a study conducted by Teledyne Isotopes Corporation to investigate the long term impacts of Milrow on water resources. Two different models were used. The first suggested that water contamination by Milorw would not likely reach the ocean for one hundred years. The second indicated that it might take only six years and would continue for an additional sixty-six years with radioactivity levels up to three hundred times permissible concentrations. This study was completely deleted from the AEC report.

Shot Cannikin

The Cannikin test would be the largest nuclear test ever conducted. The warhead itself would be the size of a football field and yield a five million ton blast. It would be placed in a borehole drilled down to 6,150 feet, big enough to hold four Sears Towers put end on end.

Soon after the Milrow test, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was passed. The act required each federal agency to file a detailed statement of the environmental impact of its actions. A watch dog group called the President's Council on Environmental Quality would review these statements, later known as environmental impact statements (EIS).

When preparing for their next test in Amchitka, the AEC didn't even begin to prepare an EIS until Congress was debating their appropriations and forced them to make one. When the report was released, it had few specifics and didn't mention the size of the blast. While the report stated the AEC's intention to have open meetings, give briefings, and maintain contact with Canadian and Japanese officials, there was no mention of any scientific data about earthquakes, tsunamis, or possible radiation contamination.

The behavior of the AEC lead to Senator Mike Gravel, who attempted to block congressional funding for Shot Cannikin. When the AEC chairman invited Gravel to a classified briefing on Cannikin he refused. The administration submitted its Defense Procurement Bill for 1971, the $19.2 billion package included $118 million for the Cannikin test. Although there was some debate on the issue, the bill passed and the test was to go forward.

Public Hearings

Governor William Egan wanted to hold open hearings on Cannikin. Egan wanted them modeled after the hearings that preceded the Trans-Alaskan oil pipeline. The AEC would be there only to provide their expert testimony and not to judge the merits of opposition arguments. Egan wrote to the EPA requesting the agency to take the role of judging the hearing. The AEC found this completely unacceptable and refused to surrender its sovereignty. The AEC only wanted to circulate information and receive feedback. AEC officials would read prepared statements and only answer questions submitted in advance. Outside speakers could only talk for fifteen minutes.

The first meeting was in Juneau and went as the AEC expected. Most outside witnesses were upset at the proposed test but presented little hard evidence to back up their fears. Representatives of Alaska's Department of Fish and Game pointed out that AEC's final draft of its EIS glossed over estimates of environmental damage caused by nuclear tests.

A tenser round of public hearings took place in Anchorage and included an extra day to allow all 32 witnesses to speak. Jeremy Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists, claimed the tests represented unproved and unacceptable risks that were masked by AEC's EIS statements. He went on to claim that the entire anti ballistic missile program was unnecessary. It had also come out that the army had canisters of lewisite and mustard gas that it had been storing in Aleutian waters since the end of World War II.

Public Protest

As the test date approached public protest increased significantly. Several groups formed in opposition to the test. These groups gathered signatures, took out full page ads in the newspapers, and even protested Nixon's motorcade when he came to Anchorage to meet with Emperor Hirohito of Japan. Established groups also joined in on the protest including the Alaska Nurses Society, the Alaska Medical Association, and the Alaska Conservation Society.

A group called Don't Make A Wave decided to make a dramatic statement against the test. They purchased a boat and planned to sail it to the waters around Amchitka before the test. The group named the boat "Greenpeace" to reflect their pro-environment and anti-war ideology. On September 15, 1971 eleven Canadians and one American departed Vancouver on the Greenpeace. When they neared Amchitka they learned that the test had been delayed.

They felt they could not stay the extra time because of the ship's poor condition. As they headed back to Vancouver they felt like they had failed at their mission. They soon learned their boldness had caught many people's attention. In Kodiak they were greeted with "Thank You" signs and honored with a banquet held by the mayor, police chief, and the city council. Similar events took place when they stopped over in Juneau and Ketchikan.

Protests were held in Canada as well. The Canadian Coalition to Stop Amchitka was made up of environmentalists, laborers, social workers, and religious denominations. Elematray school children, college students, and faculty marched in protest. The United Auto Workers Union officials proposed a one-day embargo on goods coming from the United States. The Canadian Parliament passed a resolution condemning Cannikin and informed the U.S that it now intended to support a total nuclear test ban. This would include on-site inspection, a position the U.S. was against.

In Alaska, the evening before the test, the Auke Tribe tried one last effort to stop the test. They appealed to Nixon and asked him to consider the Tlingit traditional belief, passed down from generations of ancient peoples, that the islands of the Aleutians were imbued with spirit and a vital component of their ancient religion, not a worthless, desolate place to be used in dangerous experiments.

In addition to protests, groups also tried to stop the Cannikin test through the courts. The Committee for Nuclear Responsibility had formed in January 1979 to block the tests. Along with several other groups, including the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Wilderness Society, and the National Parks and Conservation Association, it filed a motion in U.S. District Court trying to block the test. The court met in an unusual Saturday morning session and was only given four hours to render a decision. In a four to three vote, the court allowed the test to go forward.

Although they had ruled in his favor, Nixon had planned to go with the test no matter what the court had ruled. In a recorded conversation with John Mitchel he said "Although on national security grounds I would overrule them. But could you imagine the storm that would have arisen all over this country? The President overruled the Supreme Court of the United States, which I was prepared to do. I ordered the test, you know, John...that morning, I Kissinger, I said that you told me it was going to be a close decision. I said, "I don't give a damn." I said, "The test goes forward." We were prepared."

Shot Cannikin Damage

Once informed of the court's decision, the final countdown began. The detonation occurred just after noon, Alaska Standard Time, on November 6, 1971. The five million ton explosion registered 7.0 on the Richter scale. According to AEC predictions, Cannikin would cause small rock falls and turf slides along two miles of coast line which would dislodge 7,000 cubic yards of material. The actual area affected was twice that size and approximately 46,000 cubic yards of material was dislodged. Over a mile of the fault line on the Bering Sea coast was uplifted as high as forty-two inches. The area's natural erosion pattern was altered. Six lakes were drained, and streams filed with particulates discharged by the ground motion. The blast left a crater that became a thirty acre lake known as Lake Cannikin. Thirty six acres around the site were stripped bare and another one thousand acres was destroyed or severely damaged by the blast and pretest construction. A drill fluid dike leaked bentonite mud a quarter mile out to sea. Two miles from the test site was an ancient Aleutian site being excavated by the University of Alaska. Although the archaeologists had shored up the walls of the site, approximately fifty-four square yards of the site fell into the ocean.

Between 700 and 2,000 sea otters were destroyed in the blast, exceeding AEC estimates of 20-240. Harbor seals and aquatic birds were killed, the later having their legs jammed into their bodies by the violent, upward ground motion. Nearly 300 dead rock greenling fish were found offshore. The decline in rock sole catches in the Bering Sea indicated large numbers had been killed. Investigations in Amchitka's streams, lakes and ponds found the remains of ten thousand three-spined stickleback fish and seven hundred pink salmon were found.

Post test drilling

After the test, additional drilling was necessary to obtain core samples of shot debris in order to evaluate the warhead's performance. The hole was drilled directly into the blast melt area and reached a total depth of 7,200 feet. Drilling occurred from November 17, 1971 until February 18, 1972. This post test drilling carried with it a high risk of contamination. On February 13, the drilling team made contact with radioactive material at a level of 6,919 feet. Although precautions were taken, there was "low level unavoidable contamination" on tools, pipes, and parts of the drilling platform. Radioactive liquids were flushed back into the hole along with drilling tools. Contaminated solids and equipment were sent to the Nevada Test Site. In total, over 22,000 tons of radioactive material was produced from the drilling and shipped off site. This included four containers of cesium 137, cobalt 60, and several plutonium isotopes.

The drill-back hole was used to monitor water flow into the cavity and chimney areas. After four days of measuring it was discovered that gas laced with high levels of krypton 85 and carbon 12 were seeping upward. A build up of this gas could cause an explosion and contamination. Instead of bleeding of the gases into holding tanks, the officials chose the easier option: letting the gases slowly enter the atmosphere.

Return to Wildlife Refuge

After it was decided that Amchitka would no longer serve as a nuclear test site, the process of returning it to the Wildlife Refuge began. The Department of Interior made an assessment of the area and found terrain scars, deep ruts cause by vehicle traffic, areas of liquefied soil slides, spoil, borrow, gravel, and rock quarry pits, drilling fluids in dike ponds, and sewage lagoons filled with effluent. There were also clusters of cables on the ground, wires overhead, and scrap metal, the remains of temporary camps, piles of trash, construction pads, antenna clusters, and petroleum farms of both exposed and buried tanks. The 18 month clean up of the area began in July 1972 and cost $13 million dollars.

. Long term affects

In 1996 Greenpeace conducted studies in order to determine if there was long term radioactive contamination. Scientists collected plant, soil, and water samples for analysis. They found traces of plutonium 239, and plutonium 240. They also found a plutonium by-product americium 241 in moss and algae specimens. This long-lived and highly toxic residue poses a danger to food chains. The most alarming information was evidence of americium 241 in White Alice Creek which exits into the Bering Sea. Once Greenpeace released its findings, the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency began meeting with the organization to discuss them.

References

http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/tag/hanford/

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,903217,00.html